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Note 
 
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEC: DEPARTURE FROM PRECEDENT 
OPENS THE GATE TO “PHANTOM” POLITICAL SPEAKERS  
Esther Houseman∗
In Citizens United v. FEC,
 
1 the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that a ban on the use of corporate and union general treasuries to fund 
speech advocating the election or defeat of a political candidate violated the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.2  The majority reached 
this holding by finding that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s 
(“BCRA”)3 ban on the use of general treasury funds to finance independent 
expenditures constituted an “outright ban” on corporate political speech.4  
In so holding, the Court failed to recognize the distinct threat that 
corporations pose to the political process.5  That is, corporations are able to 
use the corporate form to create the appearance of strong political backing 
for a political position that does not reflect the support of actual individuals, 
individuals who have provided funds for the purpose of supporting a 
corporation’s political speech.6
Additionally, in reaching its holding, the Citizens United Court 
improperly extrapolated assertions from its decisions in Buckley v. Valeo
   
7 
and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.8
 
∗Esther Houseman is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law, 
where she is a staff editor of the Maryland Law Review.  The author would like to thank Professor 
Deborah Hellman for her insightful feedback and suggestions and the Maryland Law Review staff 
for their help in preparing this Note for publication. 
  The Court relied on its 
assertion in Buckley that speech restrictions based on a speaker’s wealth are 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
 2. Id. at 886–87, 896–97, 913. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, 
and 47 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 4. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887, 896–97.  
 5. See infra Part IV.A. 
 6. See infra Part IV.A. 
 7. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).  
 8. 435 U.S. 765 (1978); see supra Part IV.B. 
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impermissible9 and its assertion in Bellotti that “the worth of speech ‘does 
not depend upon the identity of its source’”10 to erroneously conclude that 
restrictions on corporate independent political expenditures are 
unconstitutional.11  Furthermore, the Court mischaracterized the 
antidistortion rationale it applied in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of 
Commerce12 as an outlier in the Court’s corporate expenditure 
jurisprudence.13  To the contrary, Austin’s antidistortion rationale was not 
an anomaly but a natural extension of the exception to corporate 
expenditure restrictions14 that the Court crafted in FEC v. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life (“MCFL”).15
As a consequence of Citizens United, political distortion will now 
manifest in two forms: (1) the political marketplace of ideas, and possibly 
the composition of representative government itself, will be skewed by the 
addition of inordinately large sums of corporate money; and (2) it will be 
impossible to trace money from corporate general treasuries back to actual 
individuals’ support for the political speech in question.
 
16  Thus, by 
allowing corporations to use their general treasuries to make campaign 
expenditures, the Citizens United majority has invited “phantom speakers” 
to participate in, and distort, American politics via the marketplace of 
political speech.17
I.  THE CASE 
   
On January 7, 2008, Citizens United, a politically conservative 
nonprofit membership corporation that is tax-exempt under Internal 
Revenue Code Section 501(c)(4),18
 
 9. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (“The First Amendment’s protections do not 
depend on the speaker’s ‘financial ability to engage in public discussion’” (quoting Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 49)).   
 notified the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia that it had released its highly critical 
 10. See id. (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777).  
 11. See infra Part IV.B.   
 12. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.  
 13. See infra Part IV.C. 
 14. See infra Part IV.C.  
 15. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).  The MCFL exception permits a nonprofit corporation to make 
campaign expenditures from its general treasury only if the nonprofit corporation meets certain 
criteria that prove the nonprofit’s shareholders actually support the nonprofit’s political speech.  
See id. at 263–64.  
 16. See infra Part IV.D.   
 17. See infra Part IV.D. 
 18. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006) (exempting “[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized 
for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare” from taxation).  
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documentary, Hillary: The Movie, “for public sale and exhibition.”19  
Hillary highlighted then-Senator Hillary Clinton’s White House record 
during President Bill Clinton’s presidency, her Senate record, and her 
presidential campaign, and it offered a critical assessment of her fitness for 
the office of the President of the United States.20  Citizens United 
scheduled Hillary for release via video-on-demand and funded an 
accompanying advertising campaign that it scheduled to run, if Clinton 
were to secure the Democratic presidential nomination, within thirty days of 
the Democratic National Committee Convention and within sixty days of 
the November 2008 general election.21  Citizens United sought to prevent 
the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) from banning the movie’s video-
on-demand distribution and accompanying advertisements under 
Sections 203, 201, and 311 of the BCRA.22  Specifically, Citizens United 
sought injunctive relief declaring that Section 203 of the BCRA 
unconstitutionally burdened the First Amendment right to freedom of 
speech—both as applied to Hillary and on its face23—so that it could 
distribute Hillary via video-on-demand without the risk of civil and 
criminal penalties under the BCRA.24
Section 203 of the BCRA bars corporations and unions from funding 
electioneering communications
   
25 using general treasury funds,26 and this 
prohibition applies to all primary elections or political conventions for any 
federal office.27  BCRA Section 201 lays out extensive disclosure 
requirements,28
 
 19. Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275 (D.D.C. 2008) (per curiam) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The film’s “release date coincide[d] with the dates when many states 
[held their] primary elections or party caucuses.”  Id.  For examples of negative commentary about 
then-Senator Hillary Clinton offered by the film’s narrator, see id. at 279 n.12.  
 including the disclosure of the names and addresses of 
 20. Id.   
 21. Id. at 275−76.  Citizens United planned to fund at least three advertisements—one thirty-
second advertisement, “Questions,” and two ten-second advertisements, “Wait” and “Pants”—to 
coincide with the release of Hillary to promote the movie.  Id.  In its filings and at oral argument, 
the FEC conceded that the BCRA § 203 prohibitions against electioneering communications did 
not apply to the advertisements.  Id. at 277 n.9.   
 22. Id. at 277.   
 23. Id. at 278. 
 24. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 888 (2010).  
 25. An electioneering communication is “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication 
which refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; [and] is made within 60 days 
before a general, special, or runoff election” or “30 days before a primary or preference election, 
or a convention or caucus of a political party.”  2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(I)−(II) (2006). 
 26. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91–92 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b), 
declared unconstitutional by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.  
 27. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a).   
 28. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81, 88–90 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434) (requiring 
political committees and individuals to file various reports with the FEC disclosing, inter alia, the 
amount of funds contributed to political candidates, the amount of expenditures made, the identity 
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certain contributors.29  For those electioneering communications that are 
not banned under the BCRA, Section 311 requires disclaimers that identify 
the sources of funding for the communication.30
To determine whether a preliminary injunction was warranted, the 
district court
  
31 first assessed whether there was a substantial likelihood that 
Citizens United would succeed on the merits of its Section 203 claim.32  
The court concluded that Citizens United could not possibly prevail in a 
Section 203 facial challenge, because to do so the court would have to 
overrule a portion of the Supreme Court’s opinion in McConnell v. FEC,33 
in which the Court had upheld Section 203.34  The district court then 
rejected Citizens United’s as-applied challenge, finding that because Hillary 
“is susceptible of no other interpretation than to inform the electorate that 
Senator Clinton is unfit for office,” the movie is “the functional equivalent” 
of the kind of express advocacy prohibited by the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (“WRTL”).35
 
of each person making contributions or expenditures, and identifying information including the 
principal place of business of persons making expenditures for electioneering communications).  
  Thus, the district court found 
that Hillary fell within the McConnell holding that upheld BCRA 
 29. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(5).  
 30. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 311, 116 Stat. 81, 105–06 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)).  
Electioneering communications that are not authorized by a candidate must include a clear 
disclaimer that provides the “name and permanent street address, telephone number, or World 
Wide Web address” of the entity that funded the communication.  2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(3).   
 31. The case was heard before a three judge panel in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia because Citizens United challenged the law using the statute’s own judicial review 
mechanisms.  See 2 U.S.C. § 437h (establishing the procedure for judicial review of actions 
arising under the BCRA).   
 32. Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278−80 (D.D.C. 2008) (per curiam). 
 33.  540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Citizens 
United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (“Only the Supreme Court may overrule its decisions.  The lower 
courts are bound to follow them.”). 
 34. The Supreme Court in McConnell rejected claims that financing “electioneering 
communications” fall within the protection of the First Amendment.  Citizens United, 530 F. 
Supp. 2d at 278 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203–09).  The district court further rejected 
Citizens United’s theory that FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (“WRTL”), 551 U.S. 449 
(2007), narrowed McConnell and left § 203 vulnerable to “‘facial invalidation.’”  Citizens United, 
530 F. Supp. 2d at 278.  Citizens United’s theory was that WRTL narrowed McConnell by holding 
that an advertisement is only express advocacy subject to the § 203 prohibition if it “‘is 
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate.’”  Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (quoting WRTL, 551 U.S. at 469−70).  The 
court found that adopting Citizens United’s theory would require overruling McConnell and 
rejected it on those grounds.  Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 278. 
 35. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 279–80; see also WTRL, 551 U.S. at 469−70 (“[A] 
court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is 
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate.”).  
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Section 203’s corporate expenditures on electioneering communications, 
leaving no possibility that Citizens United would prevail on the merits.36
The district court also determined that Citizens United could not 
prevail on its challenge to Section 201’s disclosure and Section 311’s 
disclaimer requirements.
   
37  In so finding, the court relied on McConnell, 
which had upheld these provisions “for the ‘entire range of electioneering 
communications,’” noting that “Citizen’s advertisements obviously are 
within that range.”38  Upon considering the remaining factors for granting a 
preliminary injunction,39 the district court determined that an injunction 
would not further the public interest.40  Accordingly, the court denied 
Citizens United’s request for a preliminary injunction with respect to all 
claims presented.41
Citizens United filed a jurisdictional statement, appealing the district 
court’s decision directly to the Supreme Court.
 
42  The Court dismissed the 
appeal “for want of jurisdiction,”43 and the case returned to the district 
court on cross motions for summary judgment filed by Citizens United and 
the FEC.44
 
 36. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 280. 
  The district court granted the FEC’s motion for summary 
 37. Id. at 281. 
 38. Id. (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196).  Citizens United may have prevailed on its as-
applied challenge if it had provided evidence to show that disclosure would lead to reprisals 
against its members, but Citizens United provided no such evidence.  Id. (citing McConnell, 540 
U.S. at 198–99). 
 39. To secure a preliminary injunction, a movant is required to demonstrate “that it has 1) a 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, 2) that it would suffer irreparable injury if the 
injunction is not granted, 3) that an injunction would not substantially injure other interested 
parties, and 4) that the public interest would be furthered by the injunction.”  Id. at 277–78 
(quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 40. Id. at 282.  In finding that the public interest would not be served, the court relied on the 
Supreme Court’s determination in McConnell that BCRA’s § 203 prohibitions “assist the public in 
making informed decisions, limit the coercive effect of corporate speech, and assist the FEC in 
enforcing contribution limits.”  Id.  (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196, 205, 231).  The court did 
not address two of the four preliminary injunction factors: whether the movant would suffer 
irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted and whether the injunction would 
substantially injure another interested party.  See supra note 39.  
 41. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 282.  The court denied as moot the request for a 
preliminary injunction with respect to the application of § 203 to the advertisement “Questions” 
because the FEC conceded that the advertisement was exempt from BCRA § 203.  Id. at 277 n.9, 
282. 
 42. Jurisdictional Statement at 3, Citizens United v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 1471 (2008) (No. 07-
953).  Citizens United appealed the district court decision directly to the Supreme Court under 28 
U.S.C. § 1253 (2006), which provides that “any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an 
order granting or denying . . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or 
proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three 
judges.”  Id.    
 43. Citizens United v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 1732 (2008) (mem.).  
 44. Citizens United v. FEC, No. 07-2240, 2008 WL 2788753, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).   
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judgment, basing its decision on the reasoning in its prior opinion that had 
denied Citizens United’s request for declaratory relief and a preliminary 
injunction.45
Citizens United appealed once more to the Supreme Court, and the 
Court noted probable jurisdiction over the case.
   
46  After hearing arguments 
on Citizens United’s facial challenges to BCRA’s disclosure provisions, as 
well as its as-applied challenges,47 the Court decided to hear the case 
reargued.48  The Court ordered the parties to supply a supplemental brief 
discussing whether a ban on the use of corporate and union general 
treasuries for campaign expenditures was facially unconstitutional, thus 
setting the stage to overrule either Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of 
Commerce,49 in which the Court had articulated its antidistortion rationale, 
or the part of McConnell that upheld BCRA Section 203 on its face—or 
both.50
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
The First Amendment freedom of speech has its greatest force when 
applied to political speech.51  Congress, however, has a long-standing 
history of treating corporations differently for the purposes of regulating 
campaign expenditures—money spent by individuals to advocate for the 
election or defeat of a candidate52—and has traditionally justified separate 
treatment as necessary to prevent corruption of the democratic political 
process.53  Through decades of state and federal corporate campaign 
expenditure regulation,54
 
 45. Id.; see also supra notes 
 the Supreme Court has afforded great deference to 
32–41 (describing the reasoning that led to the district court’s 
original denial of Citizens United’s request for declaratory relief and a preliminary injunction).  
 46. Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008) (mem.).  
 47. The Court heard the first round of argument in the case on March 24, 2009.  See generally 
Oral Argument, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205.pdf. 
 48. The Court heard the second round of argument on September 9, 2009.  Citizens United, 
130 S. Ct. at 876.  The Supreme Court generally permits reargument “in the most legally 
complicated, highly salient, and politically contentious cases.”  James F. Spriggs II & David R. 
Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 541 (2011) (citing Valerie Hoekstra & 
Timothy Johnson, Delaying Justice: The Supreme Court’s Decision to Hear Rearguments, 56 
POL. RES. Q. 351, 355–57 (2003)).  Citizens United is one such case.  Id. 
 49. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
 50. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.   
 51. See infra Part II.A.  
 52. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i) (2006) (defining expenditure as “any purchase, payment, 
distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for 
the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office”). 
 53. See infra Part II.A. 
 54. See infra text accompanying notes 83–106.  
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legislatures and has acquiesced to these regulations.55  Although the Court 
previously ruled that the government cannot place caps on campaign 
expenditures on the basis of a speaker’s wealth56 or limit corporate speech 
on referenda to only those issues that affect corporate interests,57 the Court 
did not strike down corporate campaign expenditure regulations 
specifically.58
When squarely confronted with a restriction on corporate campaign 
expenditures by a nonprofit organization, the Court did not find the 
restrictions unconstitutional but instead carved out an exception for certain 
corporate nonprofit organizations whose composition ensured that any 
expenditures it made reflected actual public support for its political ideas.
 
59  
Building on this nonprofit exception, the Court created an antidistortion 
rationale that justified corporate campaign restrictions on the ground that 
corporate expenditures do not reflect actual public support for a 
corporation’s political ideas and thus distort the political process.60
A.  One of the Primary Purposes of the First Amendment Is to Protect 
Political Speech 
   
The Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment with great fervor 
to the protection of political speech and discussion.  In 1966, in Mills v. 
Alabama,61 the Court found that a state statute imposing criminal sanctions 
for the publication of editorials endorsing or opposing candidates on an 
election day “flagrant[ly]” violated the First Amendment.62  In so holding, 
the Court stated that “there is practically universal agreement that a major 
purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of 
governmental affairs.”63  This political discourse, the Court noted, includes 
“discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner 
in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters 
relating to political processes.”64  Though the First Amendment fiercely 
guards political speech generally,65
 
 55. See infra Part II.B.  
 the protection of free political speech is 
 56. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 57. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 58. See infra Part II.C. 
 59. See infra Part II.D.  
 60. See infra Part II.D. 
 61. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).   
 62. Id. at 218−19. 
 63. Id. at 218. 
 64. Id. at 218–19. 
 65. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (“[T]he First 
Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing 
it.”). 
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particularly salient in the context of elections for public office.  In Monitor 
Patriot Co. v. Roy,66 the Court emphasized the unique position of campaign 
speech under the First Amendment, stating that “it can hardly be doubted 
that the [First Amendment] has its fullest and most urgent application 
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”67
This vigorous protection of political speech is undergirded by the 
Court’s protection of the marketplace of political speech in the interest of 
promoting self-government.  Protection of both speech and the press stems 
from the Framers’ intent “to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”
   
68  
Moreover, Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. California,69 
suggested that public discussion is not merely permitted but represents a 
“political duty,” and “that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert 
people.”70  This duty exists because public discussion of political ideas is a 
means to an end, the end being the “discovery and spread of political 
truth.”71
Where the governmental interest underlying a restriction on funding 
the production and dissemination of political speech is the suppression of 
communication, the Court has stated that such a restriction is aimed at the 
expressive element of spending, not the conduct.
   
72  Therefore, the Court in 
Buckley v. Valeo applied the strict scrutiny standard of review to a provision 
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”)73
 
 66. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).  
 that established 
 67. Id. at 271−72.  
 68. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).  The Roth Court derived this objective 
from a 1774 letter sent by the Continental Congress to the residents of Quebec, which explained 
that its decision to ensure the freedom of the press lies in “‘[t]he importance of . . . [the] 
general . . . diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready 
communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among 
them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just 
modes of conducting affairs.’”  Id.   
 69. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).  
 70. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
 71. Id. 
 72. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam) (“[T]his Court has never 
suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to 
introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First 
Amendment.”).  The Buckley Court contrasted the making of campaign expenditures with the 
burning of a draft card.  Id. at 15−16.  In United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court 
upheld a statute prohibiting the burning of a draft card.  The Court found the statute to be a 
restriction on conduct, not expression, because the governmental interest in protecting the draft 
registration system was sufficiently justified and “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”  
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77.  
 73. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–56 
(2006)).  
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political expenditure limits on individuals.74  In striking down the statute,75 
the Buckley Court stressed the political marketplace of ideas problem 
presented by the statute, stating that “[a] restriction on the amount of money 
a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign 
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of 
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience 
reached.”76
B.  State Legislatures and Congress Responded to the Threat 
Corporations Pose to the Democratic Process and the Supreme 
Court Deferred to These Legislatures on Campaign Finance Laws  
 
With the rise of corporate wealth over the last century came the 
concern that corporate wealth would translate into inordinate corporate 
power in the political arena.77  Legislatures responded to these concerns by 
passing corporate campaign financing restrictions, including restrictions on 
both campaign contributions and campaign expenditures.78  The Supreme 
Court granted considerable deference to the legislature in cases involving 
First Amendment challenges.79
1.  Legislatures Have Responded to Urgent Calls to Address the 
Threat Corporations Pose to the Political Process  
 
Despite staunch protection of political speech under the First 
Amendment, the rise of corporate political speech presented a pointed 
problem for legislatures and the Court’s campaign speech jurisprudence.  In 
1894, Elihu Root,80
 
 74. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7, 44–45 (explaining that the constitutionality of the statute 
depended “on whether the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting 
scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression”).  The 
expenditure provision at issue in Buckley limited expenditures by “individuals or groups” to 
$1,000 per candidate per election and by candidates themselves when using personal funds for 
their campaigns.  Id. at 7.  See generally Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–56 (2006)) (amending 
the FECA and establishing the specific expenditure limitations at issue in Buckley).  
 addressing the Constitutional Convention of the State 
of New York, advocated for legislation prohibiting political contributions 
by corporations so as “‘to prevent . . . the great aggregations of wealth from 
using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of the 
 75. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45−49.   
 76. Id. at 19.  
 77. See infra text accompanying notes 80–82. 
 78. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 79. See infra Part II.B.2.  
 80. Root was a prominent statesman who served in several political offices, including 
Secretary of War, Secretary of State, and United States Senator.  Introductory Note to ELIHU 
ROOT, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP, at vii (Robert Bacon & James Brown 
Scott eds., 1916).   
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legislature . . . to vote for their protection and the advancement of their 
interests as against those of the public.’”81  In 1905, President Theodore 
Roosevelt, delivering his annual message to Congress, echoed Root’s 
concerns, calling for legislation prohibiting “‘[a]ll contributions by 
corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose’” to 
stop “‘the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts.’”82
For over one hundred years, Congress repeatedly responded to the 
concerns raised by Root, Roosevelt, and others by enacting legislation 
designed to prevent the corrupting influence of corporate political 
spending.
   
83  For example, the Tillman Act of 1907,84 precipitated by 
President Roosevelt’s speech, prohibited corporate contributions of any 
kind to any federal election.85  Congress extended the prohibition on 
contributions in 1925 by defining corporate contributions to include 
“‘anything of value’” and imposing criminal sanctions for making or 
accepting corporate contributions.86  In 1939, responding to the “enormous 
financial outlays” made by unions “in connection with national 
elections,”87 Congress brought unions under campaign spending 
regulations, restricting union contributions under the Hatch Act88 and later 
prohibiting union spending on federal elections entirely under the War 
Labor Disputes Act of 1943.89
The first restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures (as 
distinguished from contributions
 
90
 
 81. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957) (quoting ROOT, supra note 
) came in 1947 when Congress passed 
80, at 
143).   
 82. Id. at 572 (quoting 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905)).  
 83. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. 
Ct. 876 (2010). 
 84. Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)), 
invalidated by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.  
 85. Id.  Just a few years after passing the Tillman Act, Congress extended restrictions by 
requiring federal candidates to provide financial disclosures before and after elections.  FEC v. 
Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208−09 (1982). 
 86. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 209 (quoting Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 
1925, Pub. L. No. 68-506, §§ 302, 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1071, repealed by Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 3, 20 (1972)). 
 87. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 116 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 88. Act of Aug. 2, 1939 (Hatch Act), ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified at scattered sections of 5 
and 18 U.S.C. (2006)), amended by Act of July 19, 1940 (Hatch Act Amendments), ch. 640, 54 
Stat. 767; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 116.   
 89. War Labor Disputes Act (Anti-Strike Act), ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167–68 (1943); 
Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 209.   
 90. Contributions are donations made to political candidates, while expenditures are monies 
spent to disseminate independent messages that advocate for the election or defeat of a political 
candidate.  See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i–ii) (2006) (defining contribution as “any gift, subscription, 
loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of 
influencing any election for Federal office; or the payment by any person of compensation for the 
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the Taft-Hartley Act,91 which prohibited corporations and unions from 
making campaign expenditures from their general treasuries in both primary 
and general elections.92  Though the Court did rule on cases in which 
corporations and unions raised facial challenges to the constitutionality of 
regulations on campaign contributions and expenditures, for decades the 
Court did not decide these constitutional questions and instead rested the 
cases on other grounds.93  These opinions did, however, provide some 
insight into how the Court might decide a facial challenge to campaign 
expenditure prohibitions.  For example, Justice Rutledge, concurring in 
United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations,94 stated that the 
restrictions at issue targeted “the bloc power of unions” because unions had 
made such large campaign expenditures that they had disproportionately 
swayed political sentiment.95  This targeting, Justice Rutledge explained, 
stifled rights that are “essential to the full, fair and untrammeled operation 
of the electoral process.”96  In Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United 
States,97 the Court came to a more telling conclusion when it held that a 
ban on union campaign expenditures98 did not apply to expenditures made 
from political funds financed through voluntary donations by employees,99
 
personal services of another person which are rendered to a political committee without charge for 
any purpose”); supra note 
 
thus drawing a clear distinction between monies given to the union 
52 (providing a definition of expenditure). 
 91. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947), 
repealed and replaced by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
283, § 112, 90 Stat. 475, 490 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), invalidated by 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)).   
 92. Id.   
 93. See, e.g., Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 387–88, 400 
(1972) (declining to decide whether the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947’s prohibitions 
on contributions or expenditures by corporations and unions was unconstitutional); United States 
v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 568, 589–93 (1957) (same); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 
107–08 n.1, 110 (1948) (same).  
 94. 335 U.S. 106.  
 95. Id. at 143 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96. Id. at 144.  
 97. 407 U.S. 385. 
 98. In Pipefitters, the Court discussed the ban on union campaign expenditures in the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947.  Id. at 387−88, 427.  
 99. Id. at 409.  The Court looked to § 205 of FECA for additional support for this conclusion.  
Id. at 409.  Section 205 makes it unlawful for unions to make a campaign expenditure using 
“money or anything of value secured by physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals” or 
by “threat” of such action or by “monies required as a condition of membership in a labor 
organization or as a condition of employment, or by monies obtained in any commercial 
transaction.”  Id. at 409–10 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 
Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 3, 10 (1972)).   
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voluntarily for political purposes and those given for nonpolitical 
purposes.100
In the early 1970s, Congress expanded campaign spending regulation 
once more by enacting the FECA,
 
101 legislation that the Court in Buckley 
referred to as “‘by far the most comprehensive reform legislation [ever] 
passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-
President, and members of Congress.’”102  By the end of that decade, 
legislatures in more than thirty states had enacted restrictions on corporate 
political activity, finding these restrictions “both politically desirable and 
constitutionally permissible.”103  Congress passed the BCRA104 to further 
restrict corporations from making expenditures except through political 
action committees (“PACs”).105  The justification for these regulations was 
generally the ability of unions and corporations to actually or apparently 
cause political corruption and gain political clout by making excessively 
large campaign contributions and expenditures.106
2.  The Supreme Court Granted Considerable Deference to 
Legislatures on Corporate Campaign Finance Regulation 
 
The Court afforded campaign finance regulation a considerable level 
of deference throughout the wave of federal and state regulations from the 
early 1900s through the 2000s.  In FEC v. National Right to Work 
Committee,107
 
 100. Nonpolitical purposes of the labor union fund at issue in Pipefitters included 
“educational, . . . charity and defense purposes.”  Id. at 394 n.6. 
 the Court stated that the “careful legislative adjustment of 
the federal electoral laws, in a cautious advance, step by step, to account for 
 101. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 3, 20. 
 102. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (1975), rev’d in part by Buckley, 424 U.S. 1).  
 103. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822–23 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting).  In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist commented that “such a broad consensus of 
governmental bodies expressed over a period of many decades is entitled to considerable 
deference from [the] Court.”  Id. at 823.  
 104. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, and 47 
U.S.C. (2006)). 
 105. Id.  Political action committees are funds that are independent of a corporation and are 
used exclusively to collect campaign contribution and expenditure funds.  See McConnell v. FEC, 
540 U.S. 93, 118 (2003) (defining PACs as “separate segregated funds . . . for election-related 
contributions and expenditures”), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. 
Ct. 876 (2010).   
 106. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115 (“BCRA is the most recent federal enactment 
designed ‘to purge national politics of what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of “big 
money” campaign contributions.’” (quoting United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 572 
(1957))). 
 107. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).  
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the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor 
organizations warrants considerable deference.”108
In 2003, the Court in FEC v. Beaumont
   
109 echoed the deference 
exhibited in National Right to Work, stating that the Court’s “cases on 
campaign finance regulation represent respect for . . . legislative 
judgment.”110  In holding that FECA’s restriction on nonprofit advocacy 
corporations was permissible under the First Amendment,111 Justice Souter, 
writing for the majority, opened by noting, “Since 1907, federal law has 
barred corporations from contributing directly to candidates for federal 
office.”112  The Court stressed the strong support behind the law at issue, 
describing the “century of congressional efforts” that went into carefully 
crafting a prohibition on corporate political spending.113  Describing cases 
in which it upheld such prohibitions, the Court demonstrated that these 
congressional efforts also had a history of judicial support.114  Finally, to 
clarify that the Court’s respect for legislative restrictions on corporate 
political spending was not a mere rubberstamp, the Court stated that 
“deference to legislative choice is warranted,” especially with respect to 
campaign contributions.115
Notably, the Court in National Right to Work deemed Congress’s 
finding that corporations and unions posed dangers to the electoral process 
sufficient justification for regulating the contributions of those entities.
 
116  
These dangers included both actual corruption and the appearance of 
corruption and the corporate form’s potential to exert improper influence on 
the political process.117
 
 108. Id. at 209 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
  Additionally, the National Right to Work Court 
emphasized the strength of its deference to Congress on corporate campaign 
finance regulation, declining to “second-guess a legislative determination as 
 109. 539 U.S. 146 (2003). 
 110. Id. at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted).  But see United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 
130 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result) (arguing that the majority, in avoiding deciding 
questions of constitutionality, misconstrued and effectively rewrote the statute, which the Court 
should have found “patently invalid as applied”); see also UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 593 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the restrictions on corporate and union speech are violations of the 
First Amendment). 
 111. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 149.  The restriction at issue in Beaumont was FECA’s restriction 
on any corporation attempting to make contributions or expenditures in relation to certain federal 
elections.  Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 321, 90 Stat. 490, 490–92 (codified as amended at 2 
U.S.C. § 441b (2006))). 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 152–53. 
 114. Id. at 153–55. 
 115. Id. at 155 (reasoning that corporate campaign contributions are a “plain threat to political 
integrity”). 
 116. FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982). 
 117. Id. at 209–10.  
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to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil 
feared.”118  In granting such great deference to Congress, the Court relied 
upon its finding in California Medical Association v. FEC119 that “the 
differing structures and purposes of different entities may require different 
forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral 
process.”120
C.  Regulation Based on the Speaker’s Wealth or a Corporate 
Speaker’s Business Interests Is Unconstitutional 
   
In the late 1970s, the Court issued two opinions addressing the 
constitutionality of statutes that restricted campaign expenditures.  The first 
of these opinions, Buckley v. Valeo, established the principle that a 
campaign expenditure restriction based on a speaker’s wealth is a violation 
of the First Amendment’s free speech protection.121  The Buckley Court, 
however, faced a blanket limitation on campaign expenditures, not a 
limitation specific to corporate or union expenditures.122  Shortly thereafter, 
in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court struck down a statute 
that restricted corporate speech on referenda if the referenda did not 
materially affect the corporation.123
1.  The Buckley Court Prohibited Campaign Expenditure 
Restrictions Based on the Speaker’s Wealth 
 
In Buckley, the Court addressed the constitutionality of various 
provisions of FECA, including the Act’s limits on campaign expenditures 
made by individuals or groups that are “‘relative to a clearly identifiable 
candidate.’”124  The Court in Buckley considered two FECA provisions: 
one that set campaign expenditure limits and another that set limits on 
political contributions by groups or individuals.125
 
 118. Id. at 210.   
  Under either provision, 
the Court found that “the quantity of expression[,] . . . the number of issues 
 119. 453 U.S. 182 (1981). 
 120. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 210 (quoting Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 201) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In National Right to Work, the Court noted that its decision 
was consistent with Bellotti because the Bellotti Court stated that its decision did not evaluate the 
constitutionality of laws prohibiting corporate influence over candidate elections.  Id. at 210 n.7 
(citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978)); see also infra Part 
II.C.2.   
 121. See infra Part II.C.1.  
 122. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 123. See infra Part II.C.2.  
 124. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6, 13 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 
§§ 431–56 (2006))).    
 125. Id. at 13 & n.12. 
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discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience 
reached” in the context of a political campaign was necessarily reduced.126  
Recognizing that both provisions therefore implicated First Amendment 
interests, the Court drew a distinction between the provisions on the basis of 
the degree of restriction that each placed on an individual’s or group’s 
freedom of expression and association, finding that expenditure limits 
placed a substantially more severe limitation on the freedoms of political 
expression and association than contribution limits.127
The Court in Buckley found the governmental interest in preventing 
corruption adequate to sustain the statute’s contribution limits.
   
128  The 
Court grounded its holding in the governmental interest in preventing actual 
or apparent quid pro quo129 corruption.130  The Court noted, however, that 
Congress was permitted to address not only the threat posed by quid pro 
quo corruption but also the broader threat posed by politicians who are too 
compliant with large contributors.131
 
 126. Id. at 19.  The Court reasoned that a restriction on spending during a political campaign 
necessarily restricts political speech “because virtually every means of communicating ideas in 
today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.”  Id.  
  Conversely, the Court struck down 
 127. Id. at 23.  Limitations on campaign contributions, according to the Buckley Court, place 
“only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication” of 
political speech.  Id. at 20–21.  Contributions provide only a rough indicator of a contributor’s 
support for a candidate and are merely “symbolic expression[s] of support.”  Id. at 21.  More 
importantly, a contribution is not speech by the contributor per se but is transformed into speech 
by others.  See id. (“While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate 
or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political 
debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”). 
 128. See id. at 29 (finding that “the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial 
contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First 
Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling”).  Thirty years after Buckley, the 
Court qualified its holding by striking down a Vermont statute that set contribution limits so low 
that they threatened the viability of political campaigns.  See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 
261–62 (2006) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the Vermont statute “goes too far” because “its 
contribution limits mute the voice of political parties; they hamper participation in campaigns 
through volunteer activities; and they are not indexed for inflation”).   
 129. Quid pro quo corruption is the receipt of money, as contributions or expenditures, in cases 
of campaign speech, in exchange for improper commitments from a political candidate.  Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 47.  
 130. Id. at 26–27.  Stressing the importance of fundraising to the execution of a successful 
campaign and the threat that political quid pro quo presents to democracy, the Buckley Court 
found the need to prevent actual quid pro quo corruption to be quite clear.  See id. (stating that 
actual corruption is not an illusory problem and citing the 1972 presidential election Watergate 
scandal as a particularly glaring example).  The Court also recognized that the appearance of 
corruption—the “public awareness” of the possibility of corruption stemming from large 
campaign contributions—is almost as great a concern as actual corruption because apparent 
corruption could erode public confidence in our representative democracy.  Id. at 27. 
 131. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. 
at 28) (stating that the Buckley Court recognized “that the Congress could constitutionally address 
the power of money ‘to influence governmental action’ in ways less ‘blatant and specific’ than 
bribery”).  
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the statute’s limits on campaign expenditures by groups and individuals, 
finding the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption insufficient justification for such restrictions.132  
The Court found that the danger of quid pro quo corruption was alleviated 
in the case of expenditures because expenditures do not entail coordination 
with the political candidate.133
The Buckley Court also established a key campaign finance regulation 
doctrine:  The government may not impose regulations on speech in the 
interest of “equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to 
influence the outcome of elections.”
   
134  Buckley rejected any possibility 
that the government could restrict political speech on the basis of an 
equalization interest, arguing that such an interest unjustifiably inhibits the 
political marketplace of ideas.135  Relying upon its reasoning in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan,136 the Court in Buckley found that equalization is 
“wholly foreign to the First Amendment,” as that Amendment was drafted 
“to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse 
and antagonistic sources and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”137  
Specifically identifying campaign expenditures as speech,138 the Court 
stated that the First Amendment’s freedom of speech provisions “cannot 
properly be made to depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in 
public discussion.”139  Notably, in its holdings on campaign expenditures, 
the Court did not distinguish among various “individuals” and “groups” for 
First Amendment freedom of speech purposes.140
2.  The Government Cannot Restrict Corporate Political Speech 
Based on Corporate Interests and Identity 
   
In 1978, the Bellotti Court, following on the heels of Buckley, held 
unconstitutional a statute that prohibited corporations from making 
campaign expenditures related to referenda that did not affect the material 
interests of the corporation.141
 
 132. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.  
  Specifically, the Court addressed the 
 133. Id. at 47. 
 134. Id. at 48–49.  
 135. See id. at 48–49.  
 136. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 137. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
at 266, 269). 
 138. Id. at 16−19. 
 139. Id. at 49.  
 140. See id. at 39–51 (discussing the constitutionality of campaign expenditure restrictions 
without differentiating between restrictions on individuals and restrictions on groups). 
 141. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767–68, 776 (1978).  
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constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that prohibited certain 
businesses from making expenditures “‘for the purpose of . . . influencing 
or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one 
materially affecting any of the property, businesses or assets of the 
corporation.’”142  The statute at issue in Bellotti also provided that “‘[n]o 
question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the 
income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially 
to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation,’” thus 
precluding the businesses from making independent expenditures relative to 
these issues.143
In reaching its holding, the Court reasoned that “[t]he inherent worth 
of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not 
depend upon the identity of its source,” and moreover, that political speech 
is the very type of speech that is essential to democratic decision 
making.
   
144  Therefore, the fact that the government has determined that a 
corporation has no material interest in a referendum does not dampen the 
capacity of that corporation to inform the public on that referendum.145  
Acknowledging the divisive role that the corporate identity plays in 
campaign finance regulation, the Court stated that “[i]f the speakers here 
were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence 
their proposed speech.”146  The Court also stressed that the First 
Amendment protects speech that is highly persuasive as much as it protects 
speech that is unpersuasive.147  Thus, the fact that a corporation’s political 
speech has substantial sway in the political marketplace is an impermissible 
basis for restricting that speech.148
The Court turned next to the section of the statute that permitted 
corporations to make expenditures should a referendum “materially affect” 
the corporation.
   
149
 
 142. Id. at 768 (alteration in original) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West 
Supp. 1977)).  
  The Court found that the statute was “an impermissible 
legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests” 
proffered by a speaker if that speaker were unable to prove a substantial 
 143. Id. at 767–68 (alteration in original) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8). 
 144. Id. at 777.  
 145. See id. at 776−77 (noting that while “[t]he importance of the referendum issue to the 
people and government of Massachusetts is not disputed,” the merits of the referendum “are the 
subject of sharp disagreement,” and suggesting that the corporation’s speech may have a “capacity 
for informing the public” on the referendum issue).  
 146. Id. at 777.  The Court characterized campaign speech as “the type of speech indispensable 
to decisionmaking in a democracy.”  Id.  
 147. Id. at 790.   
 148. See id. (“[T]he fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to 
suppress it . . . .”). 
 149. Id. at 784.  
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interest in a particular subject.150
Though blanket restrictions on campaign expenditures like the 
restriction at issue in Buckley are subject to strict scrutiny,
  In so finding, the Court did not draw a 
clear distinction between corporate identity discrimination and corporate 
interest discrimination. 
151 restrictions 
based on the characteristics of a particular speaker or on the context of the 
speech are not foreclosed by the Court’s jurisprudence.  In Minneapolis 
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,152 the Court 
stated that differential treatment of speakers is suspect “unless justified by 
some special characteristic” of the regulated class.153  Moreover, the rights 
of certain speakers may turn on the context of the speech.  For example, in 
the school context, a student’s right to speak may not be “‘automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings’” because the context 
requires limitation of those rights.154  Additional examples of 
constitutionally permissible identity-based restrictions include restrictions 
on the speech rights of prisoners,155 foreigners,156 government 
employees,157 and members of the military.158
 
 150. Id.  
 
 151. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1976) (per curiam).  Because expenditure 
limitations impose a large burden on the freedom of speech and association, the governmental 
interests underlying the limitations are subject to “the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations 
on core First Amendment rights of political expression.”  Id. 
 152. 460 U.S. 575 (1983). 
 153. See id. at 585, 591 (holding that a Minnesota tax on ink and paper violated the First 
Amendment because “it single[d] out the press, . . . target[ed] a small group of newspapers,” and 
no special characteristic of the press justified the tax).  
 154. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007) (quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).  
 155. See, e.g., Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (stating 
that the First Amendment rights of inmates are limited by “the legitimate penological objectives of 
the corrections system” and the involuntary nature of incarceration, which sets prisons apart from 
normal society (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 156. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1) (2006) (prohibiting foreign nationals from making 
contributions or expenditures toward a federal, state, or local election).   
 157. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Assoc. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 554, 
556 (1973) (upholding the Hatch Act’s prohibition on executive branch employees “taking an 
active part in political management or political campaigns”). 
 158. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (stating that the unique “character of 
the military community and of the military mission” permits the differential treatment of members 
of the military under the First Amendment).  
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D.  The Court Created an Exception for Certain Nonprofit 
Corporations Whose Expenditures Reflected Actual Political 
Support for Its Speech, and It Subsequently Built Its Antidistortion 
Rationale from This Reasoning 
In the 1980s, the Court began to clearly articulate and uphold the 
government’s interest in restricting corporate campaign expenditures—to 
ensure that political speech reflected the actual views of those persons 
whose money was used to propagate the speech.  In 1986, the Court, in 
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (“MCFL”), ruled on an as-
applied challenge to Section 316 of FECA, which specifically “prohibits 
corporations from using [general] treasury funds to make an expenditure ‘in 
connection with’ any federal election.”159  Massachusetts Citizens for Life 
(“MCFL”) is “a nonprofit, nonstock corporation” that used its general 
treasury funds to make an expenditure affecting a federal election rather 
than making its expenditure using contributions drawn from a segregated 
fund established for political purposes.160  The Court held that the 
restriction on the use of the general treasury to make campaign expenditures 
was unconstitutional as applied to MCFL and in doing so established a 
three-prong exception—the MCFL exception—to FECA’s prohibition on 
corporate expenditures using general treasury funds.161  To satisfy the 
exception, a corporation must (1) be “formed for the express purpose of 
promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities,” (2) 
have no shareholders or other persons with claims to the corporation’s 
“assets or earnings,” and (3) not accept contributions from businesses 
corporations or labor unions.162
The MCFL exception derived from the governmental interest that was 
a primary driver of campaign finance reform: preventing “the corrosive 
influence of concentrated corporate wealth” from affecting “the integrity of 
the marketplace of political ideas.”
 
163
 
 159. 479 U.S. 238, 241 (1986) (quoting Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 316, 90 Stat. 475, 490 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), 
invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)).  
  The Court, however, did not find 
 160. Id.  This separate, segregated fund would constitute a PAC.  For a definition of PACs, see 
supra note 105.   
 161. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263–64.  
 162. Id. at 264.  
 163. Id. at 257.  In assessing the FEC’s argument that the application of FECA § 316 to MCFL 
was permissible, the Court briefly described its extensive history of permitting corporate 
campaign finance regulation.  Id.  This history includes permitting the restriction of “political war 
chests” amassed using the corporate form, FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 
U.S. 480, 501 (1985), permitting restrictions in the interest of eliminating the impact of 
aggregated corporate wealth on federal elections, Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United 
States, 407 U.S. 385, 416 (1972), stemming the influence of “large aggregations of capital,” 
United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957), and regulating money amassed due to the 
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this interest sufficient to support a restriction on corporate campaign 
expenditures where the corporation met the Court’s three-prong test.164  
Though the MCFL Court may have appeared to lean toward supporting an 
equalization rationale because it supported legislative restrictions on the 
political speech of wealthy corporations that threatened to drown out the 
voices of others,165 it explicitly disavowed such a justification, stating that 
“[p]olitical ‘free trade’ does not necessarily require that all who participate 
in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources.”166  Rather, 
the MCFL Court found that political expenditures from a corporation’s 
general treasury do not necessarily reflect “popular support for the 
corporation’s political ideas,” but instead merely reflect “the economically 
motivated decisions of investors and customers.”167  Thus, corporate 
resources create the risk of a corporation becoming “a formidable political 
presence,” despite the fact that a corporation’s political ideas likely have no 
foundation in actual public support.168
As the MCFL Court explained, FECA’s PAC provisions prevent 
corporate resource dominance in the political marketplace by ensuring that 
a corporation promulgates its political ideas using a fund that “in fact 
reflect[s] popular support for the [corporation’s] political positions.”
  In sum, wealth itself is not the 
problem: The problem is that wealth amassed by a corporation and spent on 
campaign expenditures does not reflect actual public support for the 
expenditures.   
169  
This interest is tied to protecting the integrity of the political marketplace of 
ideas because it ensures that competition in the marketplace “is truly 
competition among ideas.”170
 
benefits that accompany the corporate form, FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 
207 (1982). 
  Massachusetts Citizens for Life was granted 
an exception under FECA specifically because the three characteristics 
 164. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 256–63 (explaining how MCFL’s satisfaction of the three-factor 
test eliminates the concerns that underlie the corporate expenditure restriction).    
 165. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.  
 166. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added).  
 167. Id. at 258.  
 168. See id. (explaining that “the power of the corporation”—its corporate resources—“may be 
no reflection of the power of its ideas”).  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 259.  The Court’s reverence for the protection of the marketplace of ideas under the 
First Amendment can be traced back to Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616 (1919) in which he championed an open marketplace, stating, 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to 
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and 
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.  
250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).   
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outlined by the Court171
In 1990, the Court used its reasoning in MCFL to articulate an 
antidistortion rationale for regulating corporate campaign expenditures.  
Faced with a state statute that prohibited corporations from using corporate 
treasury funds to make expenditures in relation to a candidate for state 
office, the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce used the 
MCFL reasoning to formulate and define the governmental interest in 
preventing corporate wealth from distorting the political marketplace.
 ensure that MCFL and other exempt corporations 
do not pose a threat to the integrity of the political marketplace. 
172  
This governmental antidistortion interest, according to the Austin Court, 
“aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive 
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no 
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”173  
As did the Court in MCFL,174 the Court in Austin clarified that the statute it 
held constitutional did not attempt “to equalize the relative influence of 
speakers on elections”175 but rather “ensure[d] that expenditures reflect 
actual public support for the political ideas espoused by corporations.”176
Applying this antidistortion rationale to the operation of the statute at 
issue, the Court held that the restriction on corporate expenditures was 
constitutional.
   
177  The Court acknowledged that the corporate identity of 
the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce did not remove it from First 
Amendment protections.178
 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 
  Nevertheless, the Court applied the MCFL 
reasoning in upholding the statute, stating that the “state-created 
advantages” of the corporate form permit corporations to “obtain an unfair 
161–162.  
 172. 494 U.S. 652, 654, 658–60 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010).    
 173. Id. at 659−60.  The Court noted that the statute in question did permit corporations to 
establish segregated funds specifically for raising monies earmarked for political expenditures, 
which ensures, like the MCFL exception, that the speech generated by the fund actually reflects 
contributors’ support for the corporation’s political views.  Id. at 660–61.  
 174. See supra text accompanying notes 165−166. 
 175. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (internal quotation marks omitted).  But see id. at 705 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he notion that the government has a legitimate interest in restricting the 
quantity of speech to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections is antithetical to the 
First Amendment.”); id. at 683−84 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority in Austin 
effectively adopted an equalization rationale that has no logical foundation because corporations 
are prohibited from spending amassed wealth on expenditures while wealthy individuals can 
spend without limit).  
 176. Id. at 660 (majority opinion).   
 177. Id. at 655.  
 178. Id. at 657 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).  
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advantage in the political marketplace.”179  The Court explicitly pointed to 
the misuse of the state-conferred advantages to potentially corrupt politics 
though the use of “political war chests funneled through the corporate 
form.”180
Applying Austin’s antidistortion rationale and the Court’s prior 
opinions, which afford great deference to the legislature’s judgment in 
campaign finance law,
 
181 in the 2003 case McConnell v. FEC, the Court 
upheld BCRA’s Section 203 prohibitions on the use of corporate general 
treasuries to make campaign expenditures.182  The Court recognized that 
since Buckley, Congress’s power to ban corporations from using general 
treasury funds to finance campaign expenditures “has been firmly 
embedded in our law.”183  In finding that BCRA Section 203 was not a 
complete ban, the Court emphasized the important role that PACs play in 
corporate political speech.184  Quoting its opinion in FEC v. Beaumont, the 
Court noted that PACs allow corporations to engage in political speech 
“without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence” that 
may not align with the interests of the corporation’s shareholders.185
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
  Thus, 
prior to Citizens United, restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures 
were firmly embedded in the law, and the Court had not overturned any 
laws that barred corporations from making campaign expenditures using 
general treasury funds.  
In Citizens United v. FEC,186 the United States Supreme Court 
overruled its earlier rulings in Austin and McConnell, holding that the 
government may not suppress political speech on the basis of a speaker’s 
corporate identity, that the government cannot restrict expenditures for 
electioneering communications, and that BCRA Section 203’s ban on 
corporate campaign expenditures is unconstitutional.187
 
 179. Id. at 658−59 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
  The Court further 
 180. Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500–01 
(1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 108–120.  
 182. 540 U.S. 93, 204–07 (2003).  
 183. Id. at 203.  
 184. See id. at 203–04 (“The ability to form and administer separate segregated funds . . . has 
provided corporations and unions with a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in 
express advocacy.”). 
 185. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204 (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 186. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
 187. Id. at 913, 917.  
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held that BCRA’s disclosure and disclaimer provisions were constitutional 
as applied to the film Hillary.188
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy first attempted to resolve the 
case on narrower grounds by addressing whether Section 203 was 
unconstitutional as applied to Hillary.
   
189  After determining that Hillary fell 
within the BCRA’s definition of electioneering communication,190 Justice 
Kennedy applied the WRTL test for the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy.191  The WRTL test provides that “a court should find that [a 
communication] is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if [it] 
is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote 
for or against a specific candidate.”192  In light of Hillary’s extended 
criticism of then-Senator Clinton, the majority determined that the movie 
could be reasonably interpreted as nothing other than “an appeal to vote 
against Senator Clinton,” and that Hillary was therefore the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy.193  Upon finding that Citizens United did 
not fall under the MCFL nonprofit exception to Section 203,194 the majority 
found that Hillary fell squarely within BCRA’s prohibition on corporate 
electioneering communications and so rejected Citizens United’s as-applied 
challenge.195
Justice Kennedy then turned to Citizens United’s facial challenge to 
BCRA Section 203.
 
196  The Court concluded that Section 203’s 
independent expenditure prohibition “is an outright ban” on political 
speech, a set of “onerous restrictions” akin to the sort of sixteenth and 
seventeenth century English laws “the First Amendment was drawn to 
prohibit.”197
 
 188. Id. at 916–17. 
  The majority rejected the argument that corporations can 
make expenditures via PACs, finding that PACs do not provide a sufficient 
means of engaging in campaign expenditures because they are independent 
 189. Id. at 888.  
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. at 889.  
 192. Id. at 889–90 (alterations in original) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 
449, 469–70 (2007)).   
 193. Id. at 890.   
 194. Id. at 891 (“Citizens United does not qualify for the MCFL exemption . . . since some 
funds used to make the movie were donations from for-profit corporations.”).  
 195. Id. at 889−90.  The Court also rejected Citizens United’s claims that § 203 is invalid as 
applied to video-on-demand distribution, declining “to draw, and then redraw, constitutional lines 
based on the particular media or technology” used for political speech.  Id. at 890–91.  Video-on-
demand services permit digital cable customers “to select programming from various menus, 
including movies, television shows, sports, news, and music . . . and watch the program at any 
time” they prefer, with the ability to “rewind or pause the program.”  Id. at 887.  
 196. Id. at 892.  
 197. Id. at 895–97.   
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of corporations.198  Section 203, according to Justice Kennedy, failed the 
strict scrutiny test because the Government had shown no compelling 
interest in restricting corporations and unions as speakers.199  Justice 
Kennedy further asserted that because “[t]he First Amendment protects 
speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each,” the Government 
cannot impose speech restrictions based on corporate identity.200  To shore 
up this assertion, the Court listed examples of cases in which the Court 
recognized that First Amendment protection applies to corporations, relying 
primarily on Buckley and Bellotti.201
Justice Kennedy then characterized Austin as a departure from the 
Court’s history of acknowledging the unconstitutionality of corporate 
campaign expenditure restrictions.
   
202  The Court rebuffed Austin’s 
antidistortion rationale on the ground that Buckley had rejected the notion 
that the government may restrict corporate political speech in an effort to 
equalize the marketplace of ideas.203  Furthermore, the majority concluded 
that the government’s antidistortion rationale was undercut by the fact that 
most corporations are actually small corporations whose receipts total less 
than one million dollars per year.204
 
 198. See id. at 897 (describing the burdensome red tape associated with the operation of a 
PAC).   
  Applying the Buckley Court’s 
anticorruption rationale to Section 203’s independent expenditure limits, the 
majority found that the rationale did not justify these limits because they 
extended far beyond the government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo 
corruption, which the majority concluded was the only governmental 
 199. Id. at 898−99. 
 200. Id. (emphasis added).  
 201. See id. at 899–903.  The Court explained that the Buckley Court invalidated § 608(e)’s 
expenditure restrictions, which applied to both individuals and corporations, but that Buckley in no 
way suggested that the restrictions would have been constitutional if placed only on corporations.  
Id. at 902 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23, 39 n.45, 50 (1976) (per curiam)).  Similarly, 
Bellotti, the Court stated, confirmed First Amendment protection of corporations when it struck 
down a state law that prohibited corporate expenditures on referenda issues.  Id.   
 202. Id. at 903.  
 203. Id. at 904.  Moreover, the Court stated that “[i]t is irrelevant for purposes of the First 
Amendment that corporate funds may ‘have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.’”  Id. at 905 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 
U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).  The Court also warned that the antidistortion rationale would inevitably 
lead to Congress banning the “political speech of media corporations” without constitutional 
concern.  Id. (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 283 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part) (“The chilling endpoint of the Court’s 
reasoning is not difficult to foresee: outright regulation of the press.”)).  
 204. Id. at 907.  The Court reasoned that the statute could not in fact target amassed wealth 
because three quarters of corporations subject to federal income tax bring in less than one million 
dollars in receipts each year.  Id.  
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interest that could sustain a restriction on campaign expenditures.205  
Furthermore, the Court stated that “it is our law and our tradition that more 
speech, not less, is the governing rule,” and thus an “outright ban” on 
corporate political speech is not an appropriate remedy for real or apparent 
corruption.206  The majority concluded that Austin and the part of 
McConnell that upheld Section 203’s restrictions on corporate independent 
expenditures must be overruled, and that the Court must “return to the 
principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not 
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate 
identity.”207
Finally, the majority determined that the Section 201 and Section 311 
disclosure and disclaimer requirements were not unconstitutional facially or 
as applied to Hillary.
   
208  In so holding, Justice Kennedy relied on two 
pieces of precedent: (1) Buckley’s support of the government’s interest in 
informing the public about the source of election spending; and (2) 
McConnell’s application of this interest to uphold Sections 201 and 311 
against facial challenges.209  Though the McConnell Court recognized that 
Section 201’s disclosure requirements would be unconstitutional as applied 
to a particular organization if the disclosures were likely to lead to threats 
and reprisals against its members, the Court found that Citizens United had 
produced no evidence showing that its satisfaction of the requirements 
would lead to such a result.210
Justice Thomas joined all of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
except for the part upholding Sections 201 and 311 both facially and as 
applied to Hillary.
 
211  Finding the BCRA’s disclosure and disclaimer 
requirements unconstitutional, Justice Thomas argued that political speech 
is entitled to more robust protection in the face of evidence of threats and 
retaliation against certain donors and that political speech is unduly chilled 
where courts only handle these cases on an as-applied basis.212
 
 205. See id. at 908–11.  The Court also rejected the shareholder protection and prevention of 
foreign influence rationales.  Id. at 911.  
 
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. at 913.  To justify its departure from stare decisis, the Court stated that Austin 
abandoned established First Amendment principles and was undermined by subsequent 
experience and “[r]apid changes in technology,” and asserted that there was no compelling 
reliance interest at stake in its overruling.  Id. at 912–13.  
 208. Id. at 913–14.  
 209. Id. at 914.  
 210. Id. at 916.  
 211. Id. at 979 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 212. See id. at 980–82 (“I cannot endorse a view of the First Amendment that subjects citizens 
of this Nation to death threats, ruined careers, damaged or defaced property, or pre-emptive and 
threatening warning letters as the price for engaging in core political speech, the primary object of 
First Amendment protection.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice 
Alito joined, to elaborate on the majority’s justification for departing from 
stare decisis.213  Chief Justice Roberts asserted that the Court had properly 
abandoned Austin because it “departed from the robust protections [the 
Court] had granted political speech in [its] earlier cases,” its value as 
precedent had weakened over time and in light of controversy surrounding 
the decision, and it threatened to permit government prohibition of speech 
in the interest of equalizing political voices.214
Justice Scalia also filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito 
joined and Justice Thomas joined in part, criticizing Justice Steven’s dissent 
for failing to show in his discussion of “Original Understandings” that the 
Framers did not intend to protect corporate speech.
   
215  Instead, Justice 
Scalia argued, the Framers intended for the First Amendment freedom of 
speech to extend to both individuals speaking alone and individuals 
speaking in association with others, with the latter of these two classes of 
protected speakers including corporations.216
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice 
Sotomayor, wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part (“the 
dissent”).
 
217  The real question in this case, the dissent believed, 
“concern[ed] how, not if, [Citizens United] may finance its electioneering” 
communications.218  Justice Stevens argued that the BCRA does not ban 
corporations from promulgating political speech, as the majority claimed, 
but only imposes justified restrictions on corporate speakers.219
Justice Stevens opened by explaining that the majority improperly 
raised the issue of whether to overrule Austin and, effectively, McConnell 
sua sponte when the Court could have decided the case on narrower 
grounds.
 
220  Additionally, the dissent claimed, the majority departed from 
stare decisis without satisfying any standard for doing so.221
 
 213. See id. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  
  
 214. Id. at 921–22.  
 215. Id. at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 216. Id. at 928–29.   
 217. Id. at 929 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 218. Id.  
 219. See generally id. at 961–79. 
 220. See id. at 931–38.  Citizens United, Justices Stevens noted, abandoned its facial challenge 
to § 203 in its motion for summary judgment, “and the parties stipulated to the dismissal of that 
claim.”  Id. at 931.  Justice Stevens argued that the majority’s resurrection of the claim was both 
“a technical defect” and a departure from “‘the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that 
courts should neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of 
deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts 
to which it is to be applied.’”  Id. at 932–33 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)).  Justice Stevens noted the following alternative 
paths to deciding the case on narrower grounds: (1) determine that a movie distributed by video-
on-demand is not an electioneering communication under § 203; (2) “expand[] the MCFL 
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The dissent characterized Section 203 not as a ban on corporate 
political speech but as a narrow restriction justified by anticorruption, 
antidistortion, and shareholder protection rationales.222  Like the disclosure 
and disclaimer requirements, Justice Stevens argued, the Section 203 
restrictions and PAC exceptions impose a justified burden on corporate 
speech.223  According to the dissent, the Court had previously upheld 
identity-based restrictions such as these in a variety of circumstances on the 
basis of compelling government interests.224  Justice Stevens argued that 
political speech restrictions based on corporate identity are constitutionally 
sound because the Framers intended the First Amendment right to free 
speech to extend to individuals, not corporations.225  The dissent used the 
history of campaign finance reform and the Court’s corporate campaign 
finance jurisprudence to support this historical interpretation.226  Justice 
Stevens noted that, at the time the First Amendment was drafted, “the term 
‘speech’ referred to oral communication by individuals,” such that 
corporations, which “were conceived of as artificial entities” lacking “the 
technical capacity to ‘speak,’” could not plausibly have been encompassed 
in the Framer’s concept of freedom of speech.227
Justice Stevens then cited an extensive record of corruption that he 
argued provided the basis for the government’s anticorruption interest and, 
by extension, Austin’s antidistortion rationale.
 
228
 
exemption to cover § 501(c)(4) nonprofits that accept only . . . de minimis [contributions] from 
for-profit corporations”; or (3) find that Citizens United falls within the MCFL exception, as 
“Citizens United looks so much like the MCFL organizations [the Court has] exempted from 
regulation” in the past.  Id. at 937–38.  
  Finally, the dissent 
 221. See id. at 938–42 (rejecting reliance, antiquity, and workability as justifications for the 
majority’s departure from stare decisis).  
 222. See id. at 961–79.  Shareholder protection is the governmental interest in ensuring that 
shareholders are not made to pay for political speech that they do not support themselves.  See 
infra text accompanying note 229.   
 223. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 942–43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).   
 224. Id. at 945–46.  Justice Stevens cited government restrictions on the speech rights of 
“students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners, and its own employees.”  Id. at 
945 & n.41 (citing Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (students)); id. 
at 945 & n.42 (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) 
(prisoners)); id at 945 & n.43 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (members of the 
Armed Forces)); id. at 945 & n.44 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1) (foreign nationals)); id. at 945 & 
n.45 (citing U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 554, 556 (1973) (federal 
government employees)).  
 225. Id. at 949−50.   
 226. See id. at 952–61 (extensively detailing the legislative and jurisprudential histories of 
campaign finance law).   
 227. Id. at 950 n.55.  
 228. Id. at 961–70.  Justice Stevens argued that the Austin antidistortion rationale is essentially 
an anticorruption rationale that is specifically tied to unique considerations relevant to 
corporations.  Id. at 970.  
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maintained that Section 203 actually protects First Amendment values by 
protecting shareholders from having to “effectively foot[] the bill” for 
political speech that they may or may not support.229
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court wrongly concluded that 
banning the use of corporate and union general treasuries to fund speech 
that advocates for the election or defeat of a political candidate violates the 
First Amendment.230  Contrary to the majority’s contention, Citizens 
United did not bring the Court back to its rulings in Buckley and Bellotti231 
but instead took a sharp turn away from the Court’s history of recognizing 
the government’s anticorruption interests and its tradition of granting 
deference to the legislature on campaign finance reform.232  Indeed, the 
Court failed to recognize that Buckley and Bellotti cannot be so readily 
extrapolated to apply to the corporate expenditure restrictions at issue in 
Citizens United, as the reasoning in those cases is far more nuanced than the 
Court’s opinion suggests.233  By misconstruing Buckley and Bellotti, the 
Court also characterized Austin as an outlier, when in fact Austin accords 
with these cases and is a logical extension of the Citizens United Court’s 
reasoning in MCFL.234  Finally, in striking down BCRA Section 203’s235 
restrictions on corporate expenditures, the Court opened the door for 
throngs of so-called phantom speakers to enter the political marketplace.236
A.  Citizens United Took a Sharp Turn Away from the Court’s Long-
Standing History of Acknowledging a Governmental Interest in 
Combating Actual and Apparent Corruption 
 
The majority in Citizens United failed to give sufficient weight to the 
governmental interest in preventing corruption.237
 
 229. Id. at 977–79. 
  Corruption has 
 230. Id. at 886–87, 896–97, 913 (majority opinion). 
 231. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.  
 232. See infra Part IV.A.  
 233. See infra Part IV.B.  
 234. See infra Part IV.C. 
 235. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), invalidated by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. 
 236. See infra Part IV.D. 
 237. Perhaps pursuing a governmental interest in preventing corruption by limiting campaign 
expenditures is a futile endeavor.  Scholars have argued that the system of campaign financing is 
“hydraulic” in nature—that money always finds a pathway into campaigns—and so the problem 
of money and politics is simply intractable.  Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 118, 120 (2010) (citing Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of 
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999)) (noting that political money has 
used outlets such as PACs to circumvent the regulatory system).  
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infiltrated politics via corporate contributions and expenditures in two 
distinct ways: (1) actual corruption wherein corporate political spending 
directly influenced politicians and policy; and (2) apparent political 
corruption, which eroded the American public’s trust in its government.238  
The majority in Citizens United failed to fully address these modes of 
corruption because it mistakenly used dicta from Buckley to find that the 
only governmental interest that can sustain a campaign expenditure 
restriction is the prevention of quid pro quo corruption.239
Numerous instances of quid pro quo corruption have been documented 
throughout this nation’s history.
 
240  In the 1830s, banks and corporations 
began making sizable donations to political parties in an effort to sway 
policy in their favor.241  They did not limit their efforts to contributions.  
When Andrew Jackson “declared himself an enemy of the Bank of the 
United States,” the president of the bank spent $42,000 to conduct a 
campaign against Jackson, a candidate in the 1832 presidential election.242  
In response to this long history and riding the tide of anger over the 
Watergate scandal, Congress passed the 1974 FECA amendments, 
tightening restrictions on campaign finance.243
Despite FECA’s restrictions on contributions, corporations were able 
to skirt these restrictions throughout the 1980s and 1990s by making 
expenditures for “issue advocacy.”  Issue advocacy involves those 
expenditures for political speech that avoid the use of “magic words” 
identified in Buckley to represent express advocacy for a candidate’s 
election or defeat, and thus avoid contribution limits.
  
244
 
 238. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 555–60, 622–25 (D.D.C.) (per curiam) 
(opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (analyzing numerous examples of the corrupting influence of 
corporate expenditures on politics in the years prior to BCRA’s passage), judgment rev’d in part 
by 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  But see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (“The McConnell record was 
over 100,000 pages long, yet it does not have any direct examples of votes being exchanged 
for . . . expenditures.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
  Throughout 
election cycles in the 1990s and in the 2000 election cycle, corporations 
 239. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was 
limited to quid pro quo corruption.”).  
 240. See, e.g., MELVIN I. UROFSKY, MONEY AND FREE SPEECH: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
AND THE COURTS 5–11 (2005) (providing numerous examples of quid pro quo corruption among 
politicians and corporations dating back to the late 1700s).   
 241. Id. at 7.  
 242. Id.  Jackson prevailed and later did close the bank.  Id. 
 243. Id. at 46.  
 244. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Buckley 
identified “Elect John Smith” or “Vote Against Jane Doe” as “magic words” that constituted 
express, rather than issue, advocacy.  Id.  Issue advocacy avoids such words so that the related 
campaign speech cannot be classified as an express call to vote for or against a candidate, thus 
skirting FECA restrictions.  Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (per curiam)).   
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spent millions of dollars from their general treasuries on issue 
advertisements, scheduled them to air close to primary and general 
elections, and even used misleading names that resembled grassroots 
organizations to conceal the identity of corporate speakers.245  Where 
corporations make campaign expenditures under the guise of a grassroots 
organization, the disclosure and disclaimer requirements that the majority 
upheld in Citizens United246
The majority in Citizens United brushed aside these clear examples of 
corruption by oversimplifying Buckley.  The Court concluded that Buckley 
only permitted campaign finance restrictions if the governmental interest 
was to prevent quid pro quo corruption,
 will be of little use in ensuring that the public 
is properly informed of the identity of a political speaker. 
247 yet in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC,248 the Court had stated that Buckley did not, in fact, limit 
permissible governmental interests in restricting campaign finance to only 
the prevention of quid pro quo corruption.249  Indeed, Buckley expressly 
stated that quid pro quo corruption is the most blatant form of corruption, 
but that Congress is certainly permitted to restrict spending where even the 
appearance of corruption was of concern.250
B.  The Citizens United Court Mistakenly Extrapolated the Reasoning 
in Buckley and Bellotti to Strike Restrictions on Corporate 
Campaign Speech 
 
The majority in Citizens United incorrectly took the holdings and 
reasoning in both Buckley and Bellotti and extrapolated from them to reach 
the erroneous conclusion that these cases prohibited the government from 
regulating corporate expenditures.  Both Buckley and Bellotti, however, 
addressed statutes that were distinguishable from BCRA’s Section 203 ban 
 
 245. Id. at 127–28.  For example, Citizens for Better Medicare “was not a grassroots 
organization of citizens, as its name might suggest,” but instead was the misleading platform of 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of drug manufacturers.  
Id. at 128 & n.22. 
 246. See supra text accompanying note 209.  
 247. See supra text accompanying note 205.   
 248. 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 249. See id. at 389 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28) (“In [Buckley], we recognized a concern not 
confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too 
compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”). 
 250. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27−28 (acknowledging that “the giving and taking of bribes deal 
with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental 
action,” and commenting that “Congress was surely entitled to conclude that . . . contribution 
ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of 
corruption inherent in [the] system”).  
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on corporate expenditures and reached holdings that did not prohibit the 
government from restricting corporate expenditures.251
The campaign expenditure provision at issue in Buckley applied not 
only to corporations but also to groups and individuals generally.
   
252  As 
Justice Stevens pointed out in his Citizens United dissent, Buckley explicitly 
distinguished between contributions and expenditures with respect to the 
degree of restriction placed on political speech, but it was silent on whether 
a restriction on expenditures would be constitutional if it were narrowly 
tailored to restrict only corporations.253  Thus, Buckley effectively left the 
door open for legislatures to impose restrictions on corporate expenditures 
on the basis of the threat that the corporate form poses to the integrity of our 
political marketplace of ideas and, by extension, our democratic system as a 
whole.254  Legislatures did, in fact, walk through that door with BCRA 
Section 203 and other restrictions on corporate campaign finance, and, as a 
result, the “power to prohibit corporations and unions from using funds in 
their treasuries to finance [campaign expenditures] . . . [became] firmly 
embedded in our law.”255
Additionally, in holding expenditure limits on individuals and groups 
unconstitutional, the Buckley Court emphasized that a governmental interest 
in equalizing the relative voices of individuals is “wholly foreign to the 
First Amendment”—that First Amendment protections do not depend upon 
an individual’s “financial ability to engage in public discussion.”
 
256
 
 251. The Buckley Court confronted a statute that placed a blanket restriction on campaign 
expenditures from any individual or group.  Id. at 13 (citing Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 3, 9–10 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 
§§ 431–56 (2006)).  The Bellotti Court faced a statute that restricted corporations from making 
expenditures in relation to referenda if the referenda did not affect the corporation’s “material 
interest.”  First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1978) (quoting MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)). 
  By 
emphasizing the wealth of an individual as an impermissible basis for 
regulating expenditures and remaining silent on the permissibility of 
regulating expenditures on the basis of the corporate form, the Buckley 
Court’s reasoning is not incompatible with corporate expenditure 
restrictions.  Where corporate expenditure restrictions are aimed not merely 
at restricting corporations because of their wealth, but because of the “state-
created advantages” that promote the aggregation of wealth that could have 
a corrosive effect on the marketplace of political ideas, corporate 
 252. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.  
 253. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 954 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 254. See id. (“[Buckley’s] silence on corporations only reinforced the understanding that 
corporate expenditures could be treated differently from individual expenditures.”). 
 255. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 
876.  
 256. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49.  
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restrictions are not in tension with Buckley.257  For this same reason, the 
Citizens United majority was incorrect in focusing on the effect that a 
restriction on corporate expenditures would have on small corporations, 
which make up the vast majority of corporations258—because the 
governmental interest in restricting corporate expenditures is based on the 
corporate form.  The majority in Citizens United mistakenly believed that 
the governmental interest in restricting corporate expenditures had a basis in 
wealth itself.259
The Citizens United Court similarly erred in its analysis of Bellotti.  
The statute at issue in Bellotti imposed a ban on corporate expenditures in 
support of referenda unless the referenda substantially affected the 
corporation’s interests,
   
260 a restriction that is easily distinguished from the 
restriction at issue in Citizens United.  Unlike BCRA Section 203, which 
restricted corporate expenditures regardless of the corporate interest at hand 
or the political candidate in question, the statute in Bellotti restricted 
corporations based on the government’s assertion that corporations did not 
have a sufficient interest in particular issues, and therefore they should be 
banned from participating in political discussion of those issues.261  For this 
reason, the statute at issue in Bellotti was a viewpoint-discrimination 
statute,262 as opposed to BCRA Section 203, which was aimed at the 
corrosive effect of corporations generally, regardless of viewpoint.  The 
majority in Citizens United erred in rejecting this distinction;263
 
 257. Cf. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) (emphasizing 
that an antidistortion interest is not an interest in equalizing the relative voices of political 
speakers based on wealth), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.   
 thus, the 
 258. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907 (noting that most corporations “are small 
corporations without large amounts of wealth”).  
 259. Id. at 904–05.  This misguided focus led the Court to delve into a discussion of the logical 
fallacy of a campaign finance regulatory regime that prohibits corporate campaign expenditures 
because of their inordinate wealth but does not limit campaign expenditures made by wealthy 
individuals.  Id. at 908. 
 260. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1978).  
 261. See id. at 784 (“The ‘materially affecting’ requirement . . . amounts to an impermissible 
legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests that spokesmen may 
represent in public debate over controversial issues and a requirement that the speaker have a 
sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication.”).  
 262. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In his dissent, Justice Stevens 
described the legislative background of the Massachusetts statute at issue in Bellotti, revealing 
that, at the time the statute was enacted, the state legislature was attempting to adopt a 
constitutional amendment establishing a graduated income tax.  Id.  Despite the support of many 
legislators, the referendum to establish the tax had been overwhelmingly rejected by voters.  Id.  
In preparation for a renewed referendum on the tax, the legislature passed the restriction on 
corporate expenditures on referenda and included a provision that stated that referenda related to 
income tax did not affect the substantial interests of a corporation.  Id.  
 263. See id. at 903 (majority opinion) (stating that the Bellotti decision “rested on the principle 
that the Government lacks the power to ban corporations from speaking,” not “on the existence of 
a viewpoint-discriminatory statute”).   
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majority also erred in simply reaching the blunted conclusion that Bellotti 
“rested on the principle that the Government lacks the power to ban 
corporations from speaking.”264
C.  Austin’s Antidistortion Rationale Was Not an Outlier in the Court’s 
Campaign Expenditure Jurisprudence, but a Logical Extension of 
the MCFL Exception 
  The Court should have instead 
acknowledged that the statute in Bellotti effectively banned corporate 
speech on specific issues that the government identified, effectively barring 
the corporate viewpoint on those issues, while BCRA Section 203 barred 
corporate expenditures because of the unique threat that corporations pose 
to political speech. 
The majority failed to recognize that Austin was in step with the 
Court’s prior decisions on campaign expenditures, including the cases in 
which the Court tacitly accepted bans on corporate expenditures265 and the 
holdings in Buckley and Bellotti.266  In United States v. CIO,267 United 
States v. UAW,268 and Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States,269 
the Court faced challenges to bans on corporate expenditures, yet in each 
case the Court declined to address the constitutionality of those statutes.270  
Thus, these cases left the door open for Congress to restrict corporate 
expenditures.  Contrary to the assertion of the Citizen’s United majority,271 
Buckley, in holding unconstitutional a blanket cap on individual and group 
expenditures,272 and Bellotti, in holding unconstitutional a state statute that 
precluded corporate expenditures toward particular issues based on the 
nature of the corporation’s interest,273
 
 264. Id.   
 did not foreclose restrictions on 
corporate expenditures because of the corporate form.   
 265. See supra Part II.B.2.  
 266. See supra Part II.C.  
 267. 335 U.S. 106, 107, 124 (1948) (declining to decide whether a statute prohibiting the use 
of corporate or labor organization funds for expenditures was unconstitutional).  
 268. 352 U.S. 567, 568, 589–93 (1957) (declining to decide the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 610, which prohibited corporations and labor organizations from making any contribution or 
expenditure in relation to any election for federal office).   
 269. 407 U.S. 385, 387–88, 409 (1972) (declining to decide the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 610, and holding that § 610 does not apply to union campaign spending from funds financed by 
voluntary employee donations).   
 270. See supra notes 267−269.  
 271. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 902–03 (2010).  
 272. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 273. See supra Part II.C.2.  
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Following Buckley and Bellotti, the Court in MCFL faced a challenge 
to FECA Section 316,274 which prohibited corporate expenditures, but 
rather than hold the statute unconstitutional, the Court carved out an 
exception for certain nonprofit corporations.275  Just four months after 
Buckley, and despite the MCFL decision, Congress recodified the 
Section 316 ban.276  The majority in Citizens United maintained that if this 
ban had been challenged following Buckley, it could not have been 
reconciled with Buckley’s reasoning and analysis.277  Nevertheless, MCFL 
did not strike down Section 316 as an unconstitutional violation of 
corporate freedom of speech.  Rather, the MCFL Court held the statute 
unconstitutional as applied to MCFL and created a three-prong exception 
for nonprofit corporations.278  In formulating the exception, the Court 
clearly articulated the governmental interest that justified a ban on corporate 
expenditures that do not meet the MCFL exception: “the corrosive influence 
of concentrated corporate wealth” on the political marketplace, wealth that 
generally does not reflect public support for a corporation’s political 
ideas.279
Thus, Austin’s antidistortion rationale was not an outlier in the Court’s 
campaign expenditure jurisprudence but a logical extension of the Court’s 
MCFL corporate campaign expenditure exception.  Restrictions on 
corporate expenditures were not barred by Buckley or Bellotti.  
Accordingly, MCFL articulated and acquiesced to the reasoning behind 
such restrictions, and Austin, in turn, fully developed MCFL’s reasoning to 
produce the antidistortion rationale.  Specifically, Austin’s antidistortion 
rationale melded two characteristics of corporations that pose a “corrosive” 
threat: (1) the massive quantities of wealth that corporations can acquire; 
  The MCFL Court’s decision to deliberately articulate a rationale 
for restrictions on corporate expenditures (save for a narrow exception) is 
therefore wholly incompatible with the Citizen United Court’s assertion that 
a corporate expenditure ban would not have survived following Buckley. 
 
 274. Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 316, 90 Stat. 490 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)), invalidated 
by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.  
 275. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986) (outlining the three 
factors of the MCFL exception).  
 276. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902.  
 277. Id. at 902.  The majority reasoned that because “[t]he Buckley Court did not invoke the 
First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine” to find that the limits on individual and group 
expenditures would have been constitutional as applied to corporations, and because some of the 
plaintiffs in Buckley were in fact corporations, the Buckley Court’s reasoning precluded 
restrictions based on corporate identity.  Id. 
 278. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263–64.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, argued that the Court 
should not have granted this exemption, and that the Court should not “fine-tune” congressional 
judgment that a prophylactic measure against the corporate form is necessary given the Court’s 
previous deference toward such measures.  Id. at 268–69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
 279. Id. at 257–59 (majority opinion).  
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and (2) the state-conferred advantages of the corporate form that enable 
corporations to acquire such large quantities of wealth.280  The first 
characteristic, massive quantities of wealth acquired using the corporate 
form, presented the risk of corruption that has long been recognized as a 
sufficient governmental interest in regulating campaign financing.281  By 
focusing on the wealth as a product of the corporate form and not the wealth 
per se, the Austin Court was careful to identify the corporate form as the 
target of restrictions on corporate expenditures.  Thus, the antidistortion 
rationale was not an equalization rationale but an anticorruption 
rationale.282
The second characteristic that Austin described was critical to its 
holding because this characteristic set Austin’s holding apart from the 
equalization rationale prohibited in Buckley.
   
283  Austin targeted the state-
conferred advantages of the corporate form that facilitate the accumulation 
of wealth in the economic marketplace;284 it did not target the wealth of the 
corporation as an isolated characteristic that justified a restriction on 
expenditures.  Thus, Austin’s antidistortion rationale was not, as the 
Citizens United majority argued,285 an equalization rationale aimed at 
restricting the voices of some political speakers in order to increase the 
relative voices of others.286
 
 280. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (pinpointing the 
state-conferred benefits as the reason why the government can regulate corporations in ways that 
it cannot regulate individuals), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.  
   
 281. See supra notes 80–82; see also supra Part II.D.  Indeed, corporations are more than 
capable of acquiring staggering amounts of wealth that they can turn into campaign speech.  In 
2010, more than 100 countries had a gross domestic product of less than $20 billion.  The World 
Factbook, CIA.GOV, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).  During that same year, 119 
American corporations had revenues that exceeded $20 billion, and forty American corporations 
boasted more than $50 billion in revenues.  2010 Fortune 500, FORTUNE (May 3, 2010), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2010/full_list/.   
 282. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 970 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Justice Stevens stressed that the Court “expressly ruled [in Austin] that the compelling interest 
supporting Michigan’s statute was not one of equaliz[ing] the relative influence of speakers on 
elections, but rather the need to confront the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electoral 
advocacy financed by general treasury dollars.”  Id. at 958 (second alteration in original) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 283. See supra text accompanying notes 134–139.  
 284. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.   
 285. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.  The majority oversimplified the antidistortion 
rationale by stating simply that it is “a means to prevent corporations from obtaining an unfair 
advantage in the political marketplace by using resources amassed in the economic marketplace.”  
Id. (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 659) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the majority 
glossed over the significance of the use of state-conferred corporate advantages, providing 
superficial support for the majority’s equalization rationale accusation.   
 286. Id. at 904; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam) (articulating 
the equalization rationale as follows: “the concept that government may restrict the speech of 
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The majority in Citizens United misconstrued the antidistortion 
rationale used in Austin to stand for the proposition that corporations are a 
threat to the political process simply because of their ability to amass 
wealth in the economic marketplace.287  If the majority were correct on this 
point, then the antidistortion rationale would be in direct opposition to 
Buckley’s prohibition on regulating political speakers on the basis of wealth 
alone.288  The antidistortion rationale in Austin, however, was concerned 
with both (1) how corporations acquire the money to fund campaign 
expenditures and (2) the potentially corrosive effect that money acquired 
using the corporate form can have on the political process.  First, the 
corporate treasury consists of money that shareholders deposited in order to 
produce a return, not necessarily to support the political speech of that 
corporation; as a result, expenditures from the corporate treasury are 
generally not traceable to an individual who had the intent of promulgating 
the political views of the corporation.289  Second, because of the way 
corporations acquire money to fund campaign expenditures, corporations 
can have a distorting effect; this is so because the corporate general treasury 
does not accurately reflect public support, regardless of whether the 
corporation is wealthy.290
D.  By Failing to Uphold Restrictions on Corporate Expenditures, 
Citizens United Released Phantom Speakers into the Political 
Marketplace of Ideas 
   
By overruling Austin and permitting corporate expenditures from the 
general treasury, Citizens United effectively released phantom speakers into 
the political marketplace of ideas.  The term phantom speakers refers to the 
specious nature of political speech emanating from a corporation’s general 
 
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to 
the First Amendment”).  
 287. Citizens United characterizes the antidistortion rationale as based solely on the wealth of a 
corporation, then proceeds to attack this straw man argument by noting that most corporations are 
actually not immensely wealthy.  See supra note 204 and accompanying text.   
 288. See supra text accompanying notes 134–139.   
 289. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659−60.  Compare this scenario to a wealthy individual who makes a 
campaign expenditure out of his own funds.  The speech promulgated via that expenditure can be 
traced to an individual, whereas the corporate expenditure is traced to a fictional, state-created 
“individual.”  Where this Note focuses on the “phantom speaker” threat that manifests itself when 
political speech cannot be traced to individual support, other scholars have delved further into the 
notion that corporations are not “people” and thus should not be afforded First Amendment 
protection.  See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 245 (2010) 
(“Corporations are not people, nor are they entitled to all the constitutional rights of individual 
citizens.”).  
 290. But see Issacharoff, supra note 237, at 122 (citing David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, 
and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1994) (stating that the distortion 
theory of political corruption is a poor definition of corruption because it frames corruption as a 
“derivative” of social inequalities generally)).     
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treasury, as was described in MCFL and later in Austin.291  Money in a 
corporation’s general treasury, regardless of the size of the treasury, does 
not necessarily reflect the political ideas of those whose money makes up 
the general treasury.292  Instead, this money reflects “the economically 
motivated decisions” of those individuals, which may or may not 
correspond to the corporation’s political beliefs.293  Segregated funds 
established under PACs, which permit corporations to raise funds for the 
express purpose of putting them toward expenditures,294 were established 
to ensure that corporate expenditures reflected actual political support for 
the corporation’s political speech.295
The principle that expenditures should reflect actual public support for 
the political ideas espoused by the speaker does not require that the speech 
reflect the degree of actual political support behind the expenditure: the 
amount of money used to promulgate speech need not be proportional to the 
strength of the speaker’s belief in that speech.
   
296  To require that kind of 
alignment between campaign spending and the strength of the public’s 
political ideas would be a clear attempt at equalization.297  Rather, the 
speech must be tied to the actual support of the speakers whose money is 
being used to promulgate that speech.298
 
 291. See supra Part II.D. 
  This reasoning is the precise 
purpose behind the PAC exception and a common theme across the Court’s 
 292. See supra text accompanying note 167.  
 293. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986).   
 294. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (2006), invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010).  
 295. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258 (“The resources available to [a political action committee] fund, 
as opposed to the corporate treasury, in fact reflect popular support for the political positions of 
the committee.”).  But see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (“A [political action committee] is a 
separate association from the corporation.  So the PAC exemption from § 441b’s expenditure ban, 
§ 441b(b)(2), does not allow corporations to speak.”).  
 296. Austin made no such assertion.  The Austin Court stated only that restrictions on 
expenditures “ensure[] that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas 
espoused by corporations,” Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 
(1990), not that the expenditure be “equal to,” or in any way “proportional to,” political support 
for a corporation’s political ideas.   
 297. Professor David A. Strauss has argued that corruption is merely a derivative of broader 
inequalities in society.  See Strauss, supra note 290, at 1371–82.  This is so, according to Strauss, 
because when competing campaign spending is allowed to take place in an open market in a 
society with underlying inequality, corruption is inevitable.  Id.  Therefore, the only way to 
eradicate corruption is to eradicate the inequality in the marketplace of campaign spending.  Id. at 
1382–89. 
 298. Cf. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660–61 (stating that the antidistortion rationale “ensures that 
expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by corporations” and 
that political action committees fulfill that purpose “[b]ecause persons contributing to such funds 
understand that their money will be used solely for political purposes, [and therefore] the speech 
generated accurately reflects contributors’ support for the corporation’s political views”).  
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decisions addressing the constitutionality of corporate and labor 
organization expenditures.299
Ensuring that corporate speech is prohibited unless that speech reflects 
the political views of those whose money the corporation has used to 
promulgate it maintains the integrity of the political marketplace.  One 
prominent theory of First Amendment freedom of speech protection is that 
the marketplace of ideas is a critical component of our system of 
government.
 
300  Another, and related, prominent theory of First 
Amendment freedom of speech protection is the promotion of self-
government, which occurs in part through the exchange of political ideas in 
the marketplace of ideas.301  Both of these theories serve to undergird the 
heightened protection political speech receives under the First 
Amendment.302
Traditionally, a free marketplace of ideas implies an almost complete 
absence of restrictions on speech so that all ideas may battle each other in 
the marketplace and listeners can, in deciding which ideas to accept, reach 
the truth.
   
303  The marketplace of ideas theory emerged in early writings 
defending the freedom of speech and expression.  John Milton’s 
Areopagitica, for example, characterized the marketplace of ideas as a 
battleground of truth and falsehoods and argued that the battleground 
should remain open to all ideas, allowing listeners to hear all arguments and 
debate their merits, so that truth could ultimately prevail.304
 
 299. This theme is evident in the Court’s finding that restrictions on corporate and labor union 
campaign spending do not apply to funds to which individuals voluntarily make donations.  See 
generally, e.g., Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972) (holding 
that restrictions on labor union campaign spending do not apply to political funds to which 
members voluntarily contributed).  
  John Stuart 
Mill characterized the marketplace of ideas theory as a means to an end, the 
 300. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those 
who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to 
develop their faculties . . . .  They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you 
think are means indispensible to the discovery and spread of political truth . . . that the greatest 
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should 
be a fundamental principle of the American government.”). 
 301. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(describing the necessity and virtues of an open political marketplace of ideas). 
 302. See supra notes 68, 170, 299.  
 303. See Brian K. Pinaire, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Market: The Supreme 
Court and Political Speech in the Electoral Process, 17 J.L. & POL. 489, 491 (2001) (“[W]hile a 
‘free market’ of ideas has traditionally implied the (near) absence of restrictions on speech, 
restrictions are now sanctioned—and even, in some cases, recommended—in the interest of a 
genuinely open, ordered, and accessible marketplace of ideas.”).   
 304. See John Milton, Areopagitica, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: ITS 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 29, 37 (Garrett Epps ed., 2008) 
(“And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the 
field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength.  Let her and 
Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?”). 
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end being listeners’ search for and ultimate discovery of the truth.305  To 
reach the truth, the marketplace must be free of suppression and 
restraint.306  The theory of the open marketplace of ideas is later embodied 
in Justice Holmes’s famous dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United 
States,307 as well as in Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney v. 
California.308
Another prominent First Amendment freedom of speech theory—
freedom of speech as a means to self-government—is associated with 
Alexander Meiklejohn’s writings and his town meeting analogy.
 
309  
According to Meiklejohn’s town meeting analogy of free expression, the 
town meeting is open to all and “[t]he basic principle is that the freedom of 
speech shall be unabridged.”310  Nevertheless, the meeting must be 
abridged in some respects so that the discussion is “responsible”; the town 
meeting is self-government, not a “dialectical free-for-all.”311  Under the 
self-government theory, participants must have access to information that is 
necessary to informed decision making and be able to communicate their 
opinions to elected officials; if denied this opportunity, participants cannot 
self-govern.312  Meiklejohn’s self-government theory places a premium on 
the protection of political speech.313
 
 305. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75–77 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) 
(1859); see also Pinaire, supra note 
  The heightened protection for speech 
that is conducive to self-government is embodied in the Court’s First 
303, at 496 (“Emphasizing openness, liberty and perpetual 
questioning, Mill refined the imagery of the free exchange of ideas.  His notion that free speech 
was essential to the permanent interests of man as a progressive being, therefore, adjusted the 
model from that of ‘grappling’ to ‘discovery,’ or a search engaged in by free and equal 
individuals.”). 
 306. MILL, supra note 305, at 75−77; see also Pinaire, supra note 303, at 496 (“Truth [for 
Mill] could only be realized, or rediscovered, in the absence of restraint and suppression.”). 
 307. See supra notes 170, 301 and accompanying text.  
 308. See supra text accompanying notes 69−71. 
 309. Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 72−73 (1989). 
 310. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 22–
25 (1948).  Meiklejohn’s self-government theory emphasizes political speech above all other 
forms of expression.  Id.    
 311. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 
258–59. 
 312. Solum, supra note 309, at 73.  
 313. Indeed, Meiklejohn’s theory posits that nonpolitical speech should not be afforded any 
First Amendment freedom of speech protection.  See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 310, at 23.  The 
First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255—57, 261 (listing and describing 
the forms of expression that he believes must be protected under the First Amendment because 
they are essential to self-governing and asserting that all forms of expression that do not facilitate 
self-government fall outside the scope of the First Amendment freedom of speech).   
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Amendment jurisprudence that has long afforded heightened protection to 
political speech.314
Yet the theories of promoting an open political marketplace of ideas 
and of promoting self-government clash in the realm of corporate campaign 
expenditures.  Whereas the marketplace of ideas theory would support the 
introduction of corporate political speakers as a means of permitting a 
variety of political ideas to compete in the marketplace,
 
315 the self-
government theory would be undermined if corporations entered the 
political speech arena.  Corporate speech may, at first blush, appear to 
comport with the self-government theory of First Amendment protection 
because this theory endorses stringent political speech protection so that 
listeners have access to all information necessary for informed decision 
making.316  Corporate political speakers, however, hinder self-government 
because corporate speech is promulgated in the interest of a fictional 
individual317 that cannot vote318 and may promulgate political speech using 
money in its general treasury that was provided by shareholders who 
directly oppose the corporation’s political ideas.319
Though corporations can add speech to the political marketplace of 
ideas that individuals weigh when making political decisions, corporate 
political speech threatens the notion of self-government because an 
“individual” that cannot vote infiltrates the marketplace among individuals 
that can vote.
  
320  Moreover, a corporation infiltrates the marketplace of 
ideas using funds obtained from voting individuals, money that voting 
individuals likely did not provide to the corporation to support or aid in 
promulgating the corporation’s political ideas.321
 
 314. See supra Part II.A. 
  Because general 
treasuries do not consist of funds provided by individuals for the purpose of 
 315. The majority in Citizens United supported this result, stating that the First Amendment 
errs on the side of more speech, not less.  See supra text accompanying note 206. 
 316. See supra text accompanying notes 309−313. 
 317. In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the First Amendment freedom of speech 
protection does not extend to corporations because the Framers only intended for the protection to 
extend to human beings.  See supra text accompanying notes 225−227. 
 318. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing that corporations should not be afforded the same First Amendment 
protections as human beings because, inter alia, corporations “cannot vote or run for office”). 
 319. See supra text accompanying notes 167−168. 
 320. Granted, many other types of associations and organizations, including PACs and 
nonprofits that met the MCFL exception, were permitted to engage in political speech while 
corporations were not.  But these entities were permitted to do so because the human beings 
whose money funded these entities’ speech donated voluntarily and with the intent that the money 
would go toward promulgating the entities’ political speech.  See supra text accompanying note 
99. 
 321. Shareholders invest in corporations for financial gain, not necessarily to support 
corporations’ political positions.  See supra text accompanying note 167. 
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promulgating political speech, corporate speech may very well be in direct 
opposition to the actual political leanings of the shareholders whose monies 
the corporation uses are used to fund campaign expenditures.322  This result 
threatens the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas in relation to the 
First Amendment theory of self-government because the speech of voting 
individuals323 is effectively pitted against the speech of nonvoting, fictional 
individuals that use these same voting individuals’ money to engage in this 
opposing speech.  The ability of corporations to amass great wealth through 
the corporate form can exacerbate this threat, possibly drowning out the 
voices of the very individuals whose money funds corporate speech.  In 
turn, voting individuals are hindered in their ability to engage in informed 
decision making.324
V.  CONCLUSION 
  By holding that the legislature cannot restrict 
corporate expenditures, the Citizens United Court effectively unleashed 
phantom speakers into the political marketplace of ideas, posing a threat to 
the ability of individuals to self-govern. 
In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court held that a ban on the 
use of corporate general treasuries to fund speech advocating the election or 
defeat of a political candidate violated the First Amendment.325  In so 
holding, the Court understated the threat of corruption that corporations 
pose to the political process.326  The majority incorrectly characterized 
Austin’s antidistortion rationale as an outlier in the Court’s corporate 
expenditure jurisprudence327 when it failed to recognize that both Buckley 
and Bellotti did not entirely preclude regulation of corporate expenditures 
based on the unique identity of corporations.328  Austin’s antidistortion 
rationale was not an anomaly but a natural extension of the MCFL 
exception, which the Court created in light of the governmental interest in 
ensuring that expenditures reflect actual public support.329
 
 322. This is the precise problem the Court articulated in both MCFL and Austin.  See supra 
Part II.D. 
 
 323. The term “voting individual” encompasses both individuals acting as individuals and in 
association for political purposes.  See supra note 320. 
 324. If individuals are denied access to information because the voices of those whose money 
funds corporate speech are drowned out, they are unable to effectively self-govern.  See supra text 
accompanying note 312.  
 325. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).  
 326. See supra Part IV.A.  
 327. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (stating that Austin “bypass[ed]” Buckley and 
Bellotti” by adopting an antidistortion rationale and noting that “[n]o case before Austin had held 
that Congress could prohibit independent expenditures for political speech based on the speaker’s 
corporate identity”); see also supra Part IV.B. 
 328. See supra Part IV.B.  
 329. See supra Part IV.C.   
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State-conferred benefits place corporations in the unique position of 
being able to create the appearance of strong political backing for political 
positions that may only have the backing of a handful of actual 
individuals.330  It is this corporate form, created by state-conferred benefits, 
and the disconnect between the general treasury and the political views of 
those who fund the treasury, that the MCFL and Austin Courts pointed to as 
the key rationale for restricting corporate expenditures.331  The majority in 
Citizens United did not recognize that treating corporations differently for 
expenditure purposes on the basis of the corporate form actually aligns with 
Buckley, Bellotti, and the Court’s prior corporate expenditure 
jurisprudence.332  As a result, the Citizens United majority invited phantom 
speakers to participate in, and distort, American politics through the 
marketplace of political speech.333
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